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EXPERT EVIDENCE: THE NEW RULES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper considers the nature of expert evidence before turning to the criticisms made 
and reforms suggested by the Chief Justice’s Working Party on Civil Justice Reform 
(“CJR”) insofar as they concern its use in the Hong Kong civil courts. The paper then 
continues with an examination of the changes that will be brought about to the nature and 
role of expert evidence by virtue of the implementation of the CJR on 2 April 2009. It 
concludes with a summary and critique of those changes. 
 
1. WHAT IS “EXPERT EVIDENCE”? 
 
The general common law rule is that opinion evidence is inadmissible1. A witness may 
give evidence of those facts which are within his (or her) personal knowledge but he may 
not draw any inferences from those facts. Section 58 of the Evidence Ordinance2 sets 
down two exceptions to this rule: 
 
1) Subject to any rules, where a person is called as a witness in any civil 
proceedings, his opinion on any relevant matter on which he is qualified to give 
expert evidence shall be admissible in evidence. 
 
(2) Where a person is called as a witness in any civil proceedings a statement of 
opinion by him on any relevant matter on which he is not qualified to give expert 
evidence, if made as a way of conveying relevant facts personally perceived by 
him, is admissible as evidence of what he perceived. 
 
(3) In this section, "relevant matter" includes an issue in the proceedings in 
question. 
 
Thus, under section 58(2) a lay witness may give opinion evidence on those facts which 
can only be conveyed in such a way e.g. someone’s age (“he was old”) or appearance 
(“he was drunk”).  
 
The more important exception, for the purposes of this paper, is that in section 58(1),by 
which a “qualified” person may give his opinion on any “relevant matter” that is withi his 
area of expertise, provided that this expertise is not possessed by the court3. In that sense, 
then, ‘expert evidence’ is ‘opinion evidence’ given by someone who is deemed to possess 
expertise in or experience of the relevant subject area and whose evidence is not 
necessarily based on facts ‘personally perceived’ by him.  
 
                                                 
1 Adams v Canon (1621) Ley’s KB Rep 68, 73 ER 117 (Coke) 
2 The relevant provisions of the Evidence Ordinance are based on those within the UK Civil Evidence Act 
1972 
3 Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Doug KB 157 
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In the English case of Barings plc (in liq) v Coopers and Lybrand (No. 2)4 Evans-Lombe 
J emphasized that the court applies a four-stage test when deciding whether to admit 
‘expert evidence’. The first two stages could be said to relate to the expert himself. The 
court must be satisfied, first, that there is a body of expertise governed by recognised 
rules of conduct. The second stage is that the the intended witness must be deemed to be 
familiar with that area of expertise. The prospective witness will usually pass this second 
stage by possessing relevant professional qualifications and experience. Yet, the person’s 
expertise does not necessarily need to have been acquired in a formal manner.  An 
‘expert’ is a competent expert witness provided the court considers that he has the 
necessary expertise, however it was obtained5. ‘Paper qualifications’ are not, therefore, 
essential. 
 
The next two stages could, in turn, be said to relate to the court. The third requirement is 
that the evidence must be ‘relevant’ in that it will assist the court in resolving the issues 
before it. This was explained by Evans-Lombe J in Barings as “meaning ‘helpful’ to the 
Court in arriving at its conclusions”. Finally, the evidence must relate to an issue which is 
outside the ordinary experience of the court. It will satisfy this fourth requirement if it 
relates to a technical or specialist subject e.g. medical science, engineering, property 
valuations and auditing. Returning to Barings, Evans-Lombe commented that “Such 
[expert] evidence will not be helpful where the issue to be decided is one of law or is 
otherwise one on which the Court is able to come to a fully informed decision without 
hearing such evidence.” 
 
It is, however, important to appreciate that not all evidence from an ’expert’ is necessarily 
‘expert evidence’. In Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Wealth Full Technology Ltd6 
Deputy Judge R Tong SC stated: 
 
“The mere fact that factual evidence is given by someone with expertise in a 
particular discipline does not transform that evidence into expert or opinion 
evidence although sometimes the line between factual and opinion evidence may 
not be immediately apparent. For example, an explanation as to how a computer 
works may be purely descriptive and factual although it may require some expert 
training on the part of the person giving that explanation. On the other hand, 
evidence as to the quality of the work of a computer may be a matter of expert 
opinion” 
 
Finally, it should not be forgotten that section 58(1) states that the admissibility of any 
expert evidence is “subject to any rules”. These “rules” are identified in section 60(2) as 
the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”). There are two provisions in the RHC that control 
the admission of expert evidence. First, Order 38 rule 4 provides that the court may limit 
that the number of medical or other expert witnesses who may be called at trial. Secondly, 
by Order 38 rule 36, no expert evidence may be adduced at a trial or hearing (without the 
court’s leave or the other parties’ consent) unless the party seeking to adduce that 
                                                 
4  [2001] PNLR 22. This case has been relied on by the Hong Kong courts on several occasions. 
5 R v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766 
6 [2002] 3 HKCFI 82 at para 16 
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evidence has sought and complied with the court’s directions on the pre-trial disclosure 
of the substance of the expert evidence i.e. exchanging expert reports. These provisions 
should be borne in mind when considering both the comments in the CJR and the 
operation of the new provisions in the RHC. 
 
2. THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORMS 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
On 2nd April 2009, Hong Kong will implement the ‘new’ RHC7, which are the fulfilment 
of the nine-year-long CJR process.  
 
This process began in February 2000, when the Chief Justice appointed a Working Party8 
to review and recommend changes to Hong Kong’s civil litigation procedures. The 
Working Party went on the produce an Interim and Final Report on the problems with the 
civil courts and the ways in which these problems could be addressed. The CJR process 
culminated, over the course of the last year with a collection of primary and secondary 
legislation as follows: 
 Civil Justice (Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance 2008 (“the Ordinance”)9;  
 Rules of the High Court (Amendment) Rules 2008  
 Rules of the District Court (Amendment) Rules 2008 
 High Court Fees (Amendment) Rules 2008   
 High Court Suitors' Funds (Amendment) Rules 2008  
 District Court Civil Procedure (Fees) (Amendment) Rules 2008   
 District Court Suitors' Funds (Amendment) Rules 2008   
 Lands Tribunal (Amendment) Rules 200810  
 
The Judiciary also published a set of draft Practice Directions (comprising both amended 
and entirely new Practice Directions) to accompany the RHC in August 2008 11 . 
Following consultations with the legal profession, a further set of drafts appeared in 
November 2008. 
 
This paper does not discuss the progress of the CJR between 2000 and 200812 in detail 
but, before embarking on an examination of the new provisions on experts within the 
                                                 
7 This paper focuses on the RHC only, albeit many of the new provisions are repeated in the RDC and, 
indeed, one of  the aims of the CJR was to eliminate the majority of the differences between the two  
8 The Working Party’s membership is listed at p 1, para 2 of its Interim Report and Consultative Paper (IR). 
9Which amended the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4), District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336), Lands Tribunal 
Ordinance (Cap. 17), Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338), Law Amendment and Reform 
(Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 23) and Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 341) 
10 The full text of these items and the Interim and Final Reports, together with other useful documents, can 
be found in the CJR website at http://www.civiljustice.gov.hk   
11 These drafts have not been made available to the general public 
12 In short, the CJR Working Party produced an Interim Report containing 80 Proposals for consultation in 
November 2001 and a Final Report with 150 Recommendations in March 2004. The Chief Justice accepted 
the 150 Recommendations and these were subsequently used as the basis for primary and subsidiary 
legislation referred to in the introduction to this commentary 
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RHC, it would be worth recollecting the CJR Working Party’s terms of reference upon its 
appointment: 
 
“To review the civil rules and procedures of the High Court and to recommend 
changes thereto with a view to ensuring and improving access to justice at 
reasonable cost and speed.”13 
 
From the outset, it was accepted that the civil justice system in Hong Kong needed 
reform and that the ‘new’ rules should embody the necessary changes. The Interim 
Report consisted, in the main, of an examination of what exactly was wrong with the 
RHC and what could be done, in general terms, to put things right. In particular, the 
Interim Report identified the following ailments in the civil justice system:  
 expense  
 delay  
 uncertainty  
 “overly adversarial” practices 
 a lack of equality between wealthy litigants and poorer ones 
 “incomprehensible” procedures and 
 a “fragmented” court administration  
 
Despite the passage of time; the volume of work that has been carried out; and number of 
discussions that have been held the since the publication of the Interim Report, there has 
been no real dispute over this diagnosis and the need for a ‘cure’. Those differences of 
opinion that have been expressed since 2001 have focused, instead, upon the specific 
cures and how to implement them. In particular, the suggestion that the English Civil 
Procedure Rules (“CPR”)14 could be adopted in place of the RHC to provide a simple 
‘cure all’ was strenuously rejected during the consultation period following the 
publication of the Interim Report and it was, instead, decided to amend the RHC.  
 
2.2 The problem with expert witnesses 
 
The Working Party took the view that “The faults in the civil justice system are generally 
seen to be the product of distortions caused by its adversarial design”15. A consequence 
of this defect was a “psychology of warfare” leading to, among other things, experts 
acting as “partisan hired guns”.  
 
The Interim Report elaborated on this by quoting Lord Woolf thus:  
 
“The purpose of the adversarial system is to achieve just results. All too often it is 
used by one party or the other to achieve something which is inconsistent with 
justice by taking advantage of the other side’s lack of resources or ignorance of 
                                                 
13 Interim Report, p 1, para 1. 
14 The Working Party made extensive references to the CPR and to Lord Woolf’s “Access to Justice” 
Reports that led to the adoption of the CPR in England & Wales in 1999. The full text of the CPR can be 
found at http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/index.htm  
15 Interim Report p 10 para 26 
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relevant facts or opinions. Expert evidence is one of the principal weapons used 
by litigators who adopt this approach.”16 
 
The Interim Report also referred to a report by the Australian Law Reform Commission, 
in which it was stated that “the use of expert evidence is [alleged to be] a source of 
unwarranted cost, delay and inconvenience in court and tribunal proceedings”.   
 
The Working Party took the view that the two major deficiencies with respect to expert 
witness evidence were: 
i. the inappropriate or excessive use of experts, which increases the cost, duration 
and complexity of proceedings; and 
ii. partisanship and a lack of independence amongst experts, which devalued their 
role in the judicial process. 
 
The Working Party observed that, in England, the inappropriate or excessive use of 
experts had been addressed Lord Woolf’s proposal that the court should have “complete 
control over the use of evidence, including expert evidence.” This is reflected in CPR 
Part 35.1 which states: 
 
“Expert evidence shall be restricted to that which is reasonably required to 
resolve the proceedings.” 
 
CPR Part 35.4 adds: 
 
“(1) No party may call an expert or put in evidence an expert’s report without the 
court’s permission. 
(2) When a party applies for permission under this rule he must identify – 
(a) the field in which he wishes to rely on expert evidence; and 
(b) where practicable the expert in that field on whose evidence he wishes to rely. 
(3) If permission is granted under this rule it shall be in relation only to the expert 
named or the field identified under paragraph (2).” 
 
Further provisions include CPR Part 35.4(4) which allows the court to limit the amount 
of expert fees and expenses which one side may recover from the other. Another is CPR 
Part 35.6 by a party may put written questions to the other side’s expert (or to the single 
joint expert, if one has been appointed) about his report. Yet another is CPR Part 35.14, 
by an expert may file a written request for directions from the court, to assist him in 
carrying out his work17.  
 
The problem of ‘biased’ experts long predated both the CPR and the Working Party’s 
work. The duties of experts were summarised by Cresswell J in the National Justice 
Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Company Limited (The Ikarian Reefer)18, 
                                                 
16 Interim Report p 182 para 486 
17 By CPR Part 35.14(2)(a) the expert must, however, provide a copy of the request to  the party instructing 
him seven days in advance of filing the same with the court 
18 [1993] 2 Lloyds Rep 68 
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where His Lordship stressed the expert’s need to be independent, to confine himself to 
his own area of expertise and to co-operate with the other side’s expert(s). Despite this 
exhortation, the CPR contained provisions to reinforce the importance of impartiality. 
Most significantly, CPR Part 35.3 expressly states: 
 
“(1) It is the duty of an expert to help the court on the matters within his expertise. 
(2) This duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom he has received 
instructions or by whom he is paid.” 
 
It is also possible, under CPR Part 35.10(4), to seek disclosure of an expert witness’ 
instructions from a party (or a party’s solicitors) if one suspects that the expert has been 
given a “steer” or his report has been tampered with by anyone19.  
 
The Australian Federal Court’s Guidelines for expert witnesses contain similar provisions 
on impartiality and the New South Wales rules’ “Expert Witness Code of Conduct”, 
states:  
 
“An expert witness has an overriding duty to assist the Court impartially on 
matters relevant to the expert’s area of expertise. An expert witness’s paramount 
duty is to the Court and not to the person retaining the expert. An expert witness 
is not an advocate for a party.”20 
 
Another important development in England to eliminate the problems caused by arising 
from the use of expert evidence was the introduction of single joint experts. CPR Part 
35.7 provides: 
 
“(1) Where two or more parties wish to submit expert evidence on a particular 
issue, the court may direct that the evidence on that issue is to given by one expert 
only. 
(2) The parties wishing to submit the expert evidence are called ‘the instructing 
parties’. 
(3) Where the instructing parties cannot agree who should be the expert, the court 
may – 
(a) select the expert from a list prepared or identified by the instructing parties; 
or 
                                                 
19 The obligations under CPR Part 35.10(3) and (4) are as follows – (3) The expert’s report must state the 
substance of all material instructions, whether written or oral, on the basis of which the report was written. 
(4) The instructions referred to in paragraph (3) shall not be privileged against disclosure but the court will 
not, in relation to those instructions – (a) order disclosure of any specific document; or (b) permit any 
questioning in court, other than by the party who instructed the expert, unless it is satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds to consider the statement of instructions given under paragraph (3) to be inaccurate or 
incomplete. This was considered by the Court of Appeal in Lucas v Barking, Havering and Redbridge 
Hospitals NHS Trust [2003] 4 All E.R. 720, where it was held that all material supplied by an instructing 
party to an expert as the basis for providing his advice formed part of his instructions and was subject to the 
ambit of the rule. 
20 Interim Report p187 para 500 
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(b) direct that the expert be selected in such other manner as the court may 
direct.” 
 
This expert is not a court-appointed expert. The parties select the expert and the CPR 
leaves his instruction and remuneration to them. The Working Party opined that: 
 
 “it seems clear that where single joint expert directions are appropriately given, 
the parties are likely to benefit and the court to be better served by independent 
and reliable expert assistance. Partisan conflicting views are avoided and only 
one set of fees and expenses incurred. These are important benefits making the 
single joint expert innovation one that clearly merits consideration for 
adoption”21  
 
2.3 CJR Recommendations 
 
The following Recommendations were contained in the Working Party’s Final Report 
and accepted by the Chief Justice - 
 
Recommendation 103 
A rule along the lines of CPR 35.10(2) combined with Part 36 of the NSW rules 
should be adopted, making it a requirement for the reception of an expert report or 
an expert’s oral testimony that (a) the expert declares in writing (i) that he has 
read the court-approved Code of Conduct for Experts and agrees to be bound by it, 
(ii) that he understands his duty to the court, and (iii) that he has complied and 
will continue to comply with that duty; and (b) that his expert report be verified 
by a statement of truth.22 
 
Recommendation 104 
A Code and a Declaration for Expert Witnesses, approved by the court as 
envisaged in the preceding Recommendation, should be adopted after consultation 
with interested parties initiated on the basis of a draft code adapted from the 
Academy of Experts’ codes set out in Appendix 3 to this Final Report.23 
 
Recommendation 107 
The court should be given power to order the parties to appoint a single joint 
expert upon application by at least one of the parties, subject to the court being 
satisfied, having taken into account certain specified matters, that the other party’s 
refusal to agree to a SJE is unreasonable in the circumstances.24 
 
Other Proposals in the Interim Report for, among other things, the adoption of CPR Part 
35.4(4) and CPR Part 35.6 were rejected by consultees and therefore not recommended in 
the Final Report. Some provisions, such as CPR Part 35.14, were rejected as being both 
                                                 
21 Interim Report page 192 para 518 
22 Final Report page 324 
23 Final Report page 325 
24 Final Report page 335 
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potentially divisive and as precipitating the need to appoint two sets of experts i.e. one 
that gives evidence in court and one that is the party’s ‘consultant’, with a consequent 
adverse effect on costs25. Much reliance was placed in the Final Report on the views of 
the UK Academy of Experts26, which were critical of much of CPR Part 3527.  
  
3. THE ‘NEW’ ORDER 38  
 
3.1 The expert witness 
 
Order 38 rule 35(2) has been amended so that it now states:  
 
“A reference to an expert witness in this Part or Appendix D is a reference to an 
expert who has been instructed to give or prepare evidence for the purpose of 
proceedings in the Court”  
 
The text of this rule is an exact copy of CPR Part 35.2 and its effect is to create a 
distinction between an ‘expert’ and an ‘expert witness’. Whereas an ‘expert’ is someone 
who can presumably satisfy the first two stages of the Barings test and can advise a party 
on a specialist or technical matter, he does not give evidence to the court and is therefore 
outside the scope of Order 38 (i.e. he is a ‘consultant’ in other words). An ‘expert 
witness’ on the other hand is someone who has been specifically instructed to give 
evidence on behalf of a party and who will usually prepare a written report for the court. 
It is ‘expert witnesses’ with whom Order 38 (and other relevant provisions of the RHC) is 
concerned28. 
 
This distinction has, hitherto, not been expressly stated in Hong Kong. In England, it has 
been clear since the adoption of CPR Part 35.2 and the general view is that ‘experts’ can 
be retained by parties and that, provided it meets the appropriate criteria, their 
communications with that party and its lawyers will be privileged from disclosure. This 
means that such ‘experts’ are able to assist the party instructing them in developing the 
case. For example, they may be asked to consider the following: 
• the content of the pleadings; 
• points to be covered in the witness statements;  
• questions to ask when cross-examining the other side’s witnesses; 
• submissions to be made by counsel;  
• instructions and questions for a single joint expert, if one has been appointed. 
 
The drawback of retaining such an ‘expert’ is that it may be difficult to recover the costs 
of instructing him from the other side in taxation, whereas those of an ‘expert witness’ 
would usually be recoverable. One method of avoiding this difficulty was addressed in R. 
                                                 
25 This problem has, however, not been avoided by the rejection of CPR Part 35.14., as is seen from the 
discussion of the implications of the adoption of CPR Part 35.2 
26 The Academy’s website is http://www.academy-experts.org/  
27 Final Report , Section 20 – Expert evidence, pages 313-335 
28 See Dwyer, D, The Effect of the Fact/Opinion Distinction on CPR r. 35.2: Kirkman v Euro Exide 
Corporation [2007] EWCA CIV 6' (2008) 12 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 141 for a 
discussion of this distinction   
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(on the application of Factortame & others) v Secretary of State for Transport, 
Environment & the Regions (No. 2)29 where the plaintiffs sought to recover their forensic 
accountants’ fees, which had been charged as “8% of the final settlement received”. The 
UK Government (N.B. the defendant) argued that this fee agreement was champertous30 
and unenforceable and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, as costs, any sums 
paid under it. It was also alleged to be in breach of section 58 of the Courts and Legal 
Services Act 1990, which permits ‘conditional fee agreements’, but not pure contingency 
fees,  on a limited basis in English litigation31. The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiffs 
to recover the fees from the UK Government as the forensic accountants had not been 
retained to give evidence. They had, instead, carried out “support work” for the fishing 
industry experts who actually did give evidence in court. The agreement between the 
forensic accountants and the plaintiffs lacked the characteristics that would have rendered 
it champertous. It was also outside the scope of section 58, which is only concerned with 
agreements for the provision “advocacy or litigation services” by those persons with the 
right to conduct litigation or with rights of audience i.e. barristers and solicitors, not 
forensic accountants. 
 
Practically speaking, there will be few occasions when a party can afford to pay for two 
sets of experts i.e. an ‘expert’consultant and an ‘expert witness’. This aside, the leading 
                                                 
29 [2002] 3 WLR 1104 
30 Champerty is a variety of maintenance. A person is guilty of maintenance if he supports litigation in 
which he has no legitimate concern without a just cause or excuse. Champerty is when that person does so 
for a share of the damages. 
31 The full text of section 58 is as follows - (1) In this section “a conditional fee agreement” means an 
agreement in writing between a person providing advocacy or litigation services and his client which—  
(a) does not relate to proceedings of a kind mentioned in subsection (10); (b) provides for that person’s fees 
and expenses, or any part of them, to be payable only in specified circumstances; (c) complies with such 
requirements (if any) as may be prescribed by the Lord Chancellor; and  (d) is not a contentious business 
agreement (as defined by section 59 of the [1974 c. 47.] Solicitors Act 1974). (2) Where a conditional fee 
agreement provides for the amount of any fees to which it applies to be increased, in specified 
circumstances, above the amount which would be payable if it were not a conditional fee agreement, it shall 
specify the percentage by which that amount is to be increased. (3) Subject to subsection (6), a conditional 
fee agreement which relates to specified proceedings shall not be unenforceable by reason only of its being 
a conditional fee agreement. (4) In this section “specified proceedings” means proceedings of a description 
specified by order made by the Lord Chancellor for the purposes of subsection (3). (5) Any such order shall 
prescribe the maximum permitted percentage for each description of specified proceedings. (6) An 
agreement which falls within subsection (2) shall be unenforceable if, at the time when it is entered into, 
the percentage specified in the agreement exceeds the prescribed maximum permitted percentage for the 
description of proceedings to which it relates.  (7) Before making any order under this section the Lord 
Chancellor shall consult the designated judges, the General Council of the Bar, the Law Society and such 
other authorised bodies (if any) as he considers appropriate. (8) Where a party to any proceedings has 
entered into a conditional fee agreement and a costs order is made in those proceedings in his favour, the 
costs payable to him shall not include any element which takes account of any percentage increase payable 
under the agreement.  (9) Rules of court may make provision with respect to the taxing of any costs which 
include fees payable under a conditional fee agreement. (10) The proceedings mentioned in subsection 
(1)(a) are any criminal proceedings and any proceedings under - (a) the [1973 c. 18.] Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973; (b) the [1976 c. 50.] Domestic Violence and [1984 c. 42.] Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976;  
(c) the [1976 c. 36.] Adoption Act 1976; (d) the [1978 c. 22.] Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' 
Courts Act 1978; (e) sections 1 and 9 of the [1983 c. 19.] Matrimonial Homes Act 1983; (f) Part III of the 
[1984 c. 42.] Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984; (g) Parts I, II or IV of the [1989 c. 41.] 
Children Act 1989; or (h) the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to children. 
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authority in Hong Kong on the law of maintenance and champerty is the Court of Final 
Appeal decision in Unruh v Seeberger32, in which the views expressed on the nature of 
conditional fees and champerty in Factortame were approved of, insofar as they related 
to those actually involved in the litigation. Accordingly, the Hong Kong courts can be 
expected to take a ’relaxed’ approach with regard to the remuneration of ‘experts’. 
Finally, in this respect, it is worthwhile noting that in Tang Ping-Choi v  The Secretary 
for Transport33 the Court of Appeal took the view that:  
 
“…although an expert witness may be employed by a party to the litigation 
and/or may have undertaken activities which are inappropriate to his position, it 
is not the case that the entirety of his evidence is "tainted" thereby rendering it 
automatically inadmissible” 
 
3.2 The duties of an expert witness  
 
As already noted, in The Ikarian Reefer, Cresswell J gathered together judicial guidance 
on the conduct expected of experts. This included the following: 
 
“1. Expert evidence presented to the Court should be, and should be seen to be, 
the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the 
exigencies of litigation (Whitehouse v. Jordan, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 246 at p. 256, per 
Lord Wilberforce). 
2. An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the Court by way of 
objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise (see 
Polivitte Ltd. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. Plc., [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 379 
at p. 386 per Mr. Justice Garland and Re J, [1990] F.C.R. 193 per Mr. Justice 
Cazalet). An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the role of an 
advocate. 
3. An expert witness should state the facts or assumption upon which his opinion 
is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which could detract from 
his concluded opinion (Re J sup.). 
4. An expert witness should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls 
outside his expertise. 
5. If an expert's opinion is not properly researched because he considers that 
insufficient data is available, then this must be stated with an indication that the 
opinion is no more than a provisional one (Re J sup.). In cases where an expert 
witness who has prepared a report could not assert that the report contained the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth without some qualification, that 
qualification should be stated in the report (Derby & Co. Ltd. and Others v. 
Weldon and Others, The Times, Nov. 9, 1990 per Lord Justice Staughton). 
6. If, after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes his view on a material 
matter having read the other side's expert's report or for any other reason, such 
change of view should be communicated (through legal representatives) to the 
other side without delay and when appropriate to the Court. 
                                                 
32 [2007] 10 HKCFAR 31 
33 [2004] HKCA 127 
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7. Where expert evidence refers to photographs, plans, calculations, analyses, 
measurements, survey reports or other similar documents, these must be provided 
to the opposite party at the same time as the exchange of reports” 
 
The existence of such judicial comments did not, as already noted, prevent experts from 
neglecting their duties in England (or in Hong Kong). Thus the duty was reiterated by the 
introduction of CPR Part 35.3 and, from April 2009, a new Order 38 rule 35A will state: 
 
“(1) It is the duty of an expert witness to help the Court on the matters within his 
expertise. 
(2) The duty under paragraph (1) overrides any obligation to the person from 
whom the expert witness has received instructions or by whom he is paid.” 
 
It will be apparent that these words replicate those of CPR Part 35.3. Unfortunately, even 
the introduction of CPR Part 35.3 did not led to a change in the behavior of some expert 
witnesses (or those advising them). For example, in Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership 
Limited (Copying) 34, the judge deemed an expert witness to be biased and even irrational 
and reported him to his professional body. In SPE International Ltd v Professional 
Preparation Contractors (UK) Ltd35 Rimmer J was especially scathing of a so-called 
expert in case concerning copyright infringement. A Mr Glew had been in partnership 
with the plaintiff (SPE) for designing and producing shot-blasting machinery. He 
subsequently left to work for a competitor (the first defendant) which then produced and 
marketed a shot-blasting machine that was similar in design to SPE’s prototype. Rimmer 
J’s comments on Mr Dean, the expert witness, were damning: 
 
“Mr Dean’s main difficulty is that he has no relevant expertise. He is an ex RAF 
officer, who no doubt has a specialised knowledge and experience of many fields 
of human endeavour, but they do not include the field of shot blasting…  
 
Although Mr Dean’s report is described as prepared by him, it in fact purports to 
be the report of an organisation called “DMC”, which is a consultant agency run 
by Mr and Mrs Dean… 
 
Mr Dean made no note of the instructions he was given, because he said there 
was no need - he said he had a fairly good memory. There is no record of any 
instructions he was ever given, and he said he did not make one because no-one 
told him he should do so. He wrote letters seeking information supposedly 
relevant to his report, but did not think to keep copies of them - since no-one told 
him to... Mr Dean’s ignorance in what was required of him was compounded by 
the fact that, until he gave evidence, he had never heard of, let alone read, Part 
35 of the CPR… As a result, he approached and performed his task with manifest 
incompetence” 
 
                                                 
34 (2002) 25(2) IPD 25011 
35  [2002] EWHC 881 
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Fortunately, such demonstrations of a complete disregard of both The Ikarian Reefer and 
CPR Part 35 are fairly rare but they are not uncommon. Of far greater concern is the 
question of “independence”. The fact that an expert has a conflict of interest (e.g. he is 
employed by one of the parties) should not prevent him from giving evidence, as can be 
seen from the Tang Ping Choi decision. This was also stated to be the case by the English 
Court of Appeal in Toth v Jarman36. The real question is whether the conflict prevents 
the expert remaining independent. One way of determining this is to ask if the expert 
witness would have written the same report or given the same opinion if he had been 
instructed by anothe 37r party .  
                                                
 
In order to address such concerns, the English authorities produced a code of conduct for 
experts and those advising them, which is annexed to CPR Practice Direction 35 as the 
“Protocol for the Instruction of Experts to give evidence in Civil Claims”. This Protocol 
gives clear guidance to those who instruct experts and experts themselves as to what they 
are expected to do in civil proceedings. The Protocol draws upon earlier documents 
produced by the Academy of Experts and the Expert Witness Institute, as well as 
suggestions made by the Clinical Dispute Forum38. It was approved by the Master of the 
Rolls and has been applied since 5 September 2005. At Appendix D to the RHC there is a 
new “Code of conduct for expert witnesses” (the Code) which is intended to perform a 
similar function.   
 
3.3 The Code  
 
A new Order 38 rule 37B(1) contains the following obligation upon those instructing 
expert witnesses:  
 
“(1) A party who instructs an expert witness shall as soon as practicable provide 
the expert witness with a copy of the code of conduct set out in Appendix D. 
(2) Where the Court has under rule 4A(1) ordered that 2 or more parties shall 
appoint a single joint expert witness, paragraph (1) applies to each of the parties. 
(3) If the instruction is in writing, it must be accompanied by a copy of the code of 
conduct set out in Appendix D” 
 
A new Order 38 rule 37C goes on: 
 
“(1) An expert report disclosed under these rules is not admissible in evidence 
unless the report contains a declaration by the expert witness that – 
(a) he has read the code of conduct set out in Appendix D and agrees to be bound 
by it; 
(b) he understands his duty to the Court; and 
 
36 [2006] 4 All ER 1276 
37 Pugh, C & Pilgerstorfer, M Expert Evidence: The Requirement Of Independence J.P.I. Law 2008, 3, 224-
238 
38 The full text of the Protocol can be seen (as a separate pdf document) in the CPR website at  
http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/contents/form_section_images/practice_directions/pd35_pdf_
eps/pd35_prot.pdf  
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(c) he has complied with and will continue to comply with that duty. 
(2) Oral expert evidence is not admissible unless the expert witness has declared, 
whether orally or in writing or otherwise, that – 
(a) he has read the code of conduct set out in Appendix D and agrees to be bound 
by it; 
(b) he understands his duty to the Court; and 
(c) he has complied with and will continue to comply with that duty. 
(3) Paragraph (1) does not apply to a report that was disclosed under rule 37 
before the commencement of this rule” 
 
As to the Code itself, paragraph 1 states unambiguously that it is to apply to all experts 
who have been instructed to give or prepare evidence for the purpose of proceedings in 
the courts. Paragraphs 2 to 4 reiterate that the expert witness’s duty is to the court and  
not to those instructing (or paying) him; he is to act impartially and independently; and 
that he is not an advocate for any party. The Code thus reinforces Order 38 rule 35A  
 
Paragraphs 5 and 6 repeat the provisions in Order 38 rule 37C that an expert’s report or 
his oral evidence will not be admitted unless he includes a declaration in his report, or 
makes a separate declaration in writing, that he has read, understands and will comply 
with the Code. 
 
Under Order 38 rule 37A an expert’s report must be verified by a statement of truth in 
accordance with Order 41A and this requirement is repeated at paragraph 7 of the Code.  
Paragraphs 8 to 11 set out what must be included in the report, including the person’s 
qualifications as an expert; the facts, matters and assumptions on which the opinions in 
the report are based; and whether the report may be incomplete or inaccurate without 
some qualification (and what that qualification is). Of particular interest is paragraph 11 
which states that an expert who changes his opinion on a material matter should prepare 
and provide the party instructing him with a supplementary report. What is not clear, 
however, is whether that report is privileged or what the party is to do with it. 
 
Paragraphs 12 and 13 require experts to abide by any direction by a court to attend an 
experts’ conference and to “exercise [their] independent, professional judgment in 
relation to such a conference” and in the production of any subsequent joint report. 
 
The Code concludes with a note that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought 
against anyone who makes a false declaration or a false statement in a document verified 
by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. 
 
3.4 Single Joint Experts 
 
The most significant change in respect of expert evidence is found at the new Order 38 
rule 4A by which the court may order two (or more) parties to appoint a single joint 
expert witness to give evidence on any particular question. This is not a court-appointed 
expert as provided for under Order 40, it is a new concept and is based on CPR Part 35.7. 
The first reason for appointing a single joint expert is that it saves time and costs. These 
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savings are unlikely to be significant, however, if the parties have already appointed their 
own ‘experts’ (i.e. consultants and, presumably, prospective expert witnesses). In some 
cases, an expert will have been instructed well before the commencement of proceedings 
to advise on liability and quantum.   
 
The second reason39 is that a single joint expert is, potentially, more independent and 
objective than one who has been appointed by one of the parties. Even if that party and its 
advisers abide by The Ikarian Reefer, Order 38 rule 35A and the Code, it will remain the 
case that the expert will receive all his instructions and all his information on the case 
(including the answers to any questions he may have) from just one party. He will have 
little, if any, contact with the other side before trial except for, perhaps, a “without 
prejudice” meeting with its expert witness. His only other meaningful contact will be 
when he is cross-examined at the trial. Such an isolated position is almost bound to 
influence his view of the case.   
 
Turning to the new provisions in the RHC, Order 38 rule 4A(1) states the following: 
 
“In any action in which any question for an expert witness arises, the Court may, 
at or before the trial of the action, order 2 or more parties to the action to appoint 
a single joint expert witness to give evidence on that question” 
 
Further, by Order 38 rule 4A(3): 
 
“Where an order is made under paragraph (1), the Court may give such 
directions as it thinks fit with respect to the terms and conditions of the 
appointment of the joint expert witness, including but not limited to the scope of 
instructions to be given to the expert witness and the payment of the expert 
witness’s fees and expenses” 
 
It is likely that such an order for the appointment of a single joint expert will be given 
when the court sets down the case management timetable pursuant to the new Order 2540.   
Instead of the plaintiff being required to take out a summons for directions within one 
month of the close of pleadings under the old rule 1(1)(b)), the new rules 1(1), (1A) and 
(1B) require the parties to complete a “Timetabling Questionnaire” and serve and file the 
same within 28 days after the close of pleadings. The form and contents of this 
Timetabling Questionnaire are set out in Annex A to a new “Practice Direction for Order 
25 – Case Management”. It covers, among other things, expert evidence – specifically the 
number, identity and field(s) of expertise of any expert witnesses. 
 
It is expected that the parties should be able to agree on the identity of any single joint 
expert but, if not, Order 38 rule 4A(2) provides as follows:  
                                                 
39 Albeit it is arguably a more important reason 
40 Order 25 has been extensively rewritten to replace the “Summons for directions” with a “Case 
management summons and conference”. This is not merely a cosmetic change but, in some ways, a 
statement of intent given that all further references to the old summons for directions have also been 
deleted. 
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“Where the parties cannot agree on who should be the joint expert witness, the 
Court may – 
(a) select the expert witness from a list prepared or identified by the parties; or 
(b) direct that the expert witness be selected in such manner as the Court may 
direct” 
  
Of particular importance is Order 38 rule 4A(4) by which the court may appoint such a 
single joint expert, even if “a party to the action disagrees with the appointment” 
provided that it is satisfied that “it is in the interests of justice to do so after taking into 
account all the circumstances of the case”. Order 38 rule 4A(5) explains that these 
“circumstances” include but are not limited to: 
i. whether the issues requiring expert evidence can readily be identified in advance; 
ii. the nature of those issues and the likely degree of controversy attaching to the 
expert evidence in question; 
iii. the value of the claim and the importance of the issue on which expert evidence is 
sought, as compared with the cost of employing separate expert witnesses to give 
evidence; 
iv. whether any party has already incurred expenses for instructing an expert who 
may be asked to give evidence as an expert witness in the case; and 
v. whether any significant difficulties are likely to arise in relation to – 
a. the choosing of the joint expert witness; 
b. the drawing up of his instructions; or 
c. the provision to him of the information and other facilities needed to 
perform his duties 
 
Order 38 rule 4A(6) adds, however, that if a party disagrees with the appointment of a 
single joint expert, he shall have “a reasonable opportunity to appear before the Court and 
to show cause why the order should not be made” before the court makes its decision. 
Finally, Order 38 rule 4A(7) states: 
 
“ Where the Court is satisfied that an order made under paragraph (1) is 
inappropriate, it may set aside the order and allow the parties concerned to 
appoint their own expert witnesses to give evidence” 
 
It seems then that the parties have two opportunities to object to or avoid the imposition 
of a single joint expert. The first is at the “case management timetable” directions stage 
and the second, based on the words “set aside” in Order 38 rule 4A(7), would appear to 
be after the receipt of the single joint expert’s report.  
 
In respect of the first opportunity, there are a number of English cases relating to parties’ 
objections to the appointment of single joint experts from which some useful guidance 
may be gleaned on the possible operation of the regime in Hong Kong.  In S (a minor) v 
Birmingham Health Authority41 the court ordered that a single joint expert was to be 
appointed in relation to a clinical negligence claim. The plaintiff successfully appealed 
                                                 
41 [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Med 382 
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this decision and obtained the appointment of its own expert witness on the basis that the 
issues to be covered by the expert witness’ report were so important to the outcome of the 
case that each of the parties should have their own expert witnesses. 
 
Generally speaking, the view is that single joint experts should be appointed when and 
where there is a well-established and relatively uncontested body of expert knowledge 
whereas the parties should be permitted to have their own expert witnesses if there is a 
range of differing views in the relevant field of expertise. The English courts are more 
likely to permit the parties to instruct their own expert witnesses in substantial and 
complex claims, where the central issues are technical in nature, but it is becoming 
increasingly common for single joint experts to be appointed in all but these types of case. 
In Watson v North Tyneside MBC42 it was held that the complexity of claim, not quantum, 
was the predominant factor for appointing single joint expert. 
 
In Peet v Mid-Kent Healthcare Trust43, a medical negligence case involving the birth of 
twins, the parties were permitted to call their own experts on the medical issues but there 
was a ‘team’ of seven non-medical experts who were jointly instructed to give evidence 
on quantum. Lord Woolf, who gave the leading judgment in the Court of Appeal, 
commented “In the absence of special circumstances, evidence by a single expert witness 
is the appropriate course to be adopted when giving directions in a case of this nature as 
to non-medical experts”. Another important point made in Peet was that a single joint 
expert should be trusted by both the parties. Hence, a single joint expert should not attend 
a meeting to discuss the report with just one party, unless all the parties have agreed in 
writing or the court has directed that such a meeting may be held.  
 
The Queen’s Bench Guide also provides helpful advice: 
 
“7.9.5 In many cases it is possible for the question of expert evidence or one or 
more of the areas of expert evidence to be dealt with by a single expert. Single 
experts are, for example, often appropriate to deal with questions of quantum in 
cases where primary issues are as to liability. Likewise, where expert evidence is 
required in order to acquaint the court with matters of expert fact, as opposed to 
opinion, a single expert will usually be appropriate. There remain, however, a 
body of cases where liability will turn upon expert opinion evidence and where it 
will be appropriate for the parties to instruct their own experts. For example, in 
cases where the issue for determination is as to whether a party acted in 
accordance with proper professional standards, it will often be of value to the 
court to hear the opinions of more than one expert as to the proper standard in 
order that the court becomes acquainted with a range of views existing upon the 
question and in order that the evidence can be tested in cross-examination.”44  
 
The Guide adds that: 
 
                                                 
42 [2003] C.L.Y. 284 
43 [2002] 1 WLR 210 
44 http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/11563.htm  
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“7.9.6 It will not be a sufficient ground for objecting to an order for a single joint 
expert that the parties have already chosen their own experts. An order for a 
single joint expert does not prevent a party from having his/her own expert to 
advise him, though that is likely to be at his/her own cost, regardless of the 
outcome.”  
 
What about where a party is not happy with a single joint expert’s report? In D (A Child) 
v Walker45 it was held that appointing a single joint expert witness was the “correct 
approach”. If, however, there were good reasons to allow a party to obtain further 
evidence before deciding whether to challenge that joint report (or part of it), the court 
should grant its request to instruct another expert witness. If however the damages 
claimed were “modest”, the court should, instead, only allow that party to “put a question 
to the expert who has already prepared the report”.. It was added that “good reasons” and 
not “fanciful reasons” would need to be provided to justify the instruction of an 
additional expert46.  
 
In Cosgrove v Pattison 47, a case involving a boundary dispute, Neuberger J (as he then 
was) followed D (A Child) v Walker and allowed one of the parties to call an additional 
expert when that party suggested that the single joint expert might be biased. He 
commented as follows: 
 
“ In my judgment although it would be wrong to pretend that this is an exhaustive 
list, the factors to be taken into account when considering an application to 
permit a further expert to be called are these. First, the nature of the issue or 
issues; secondly, the number of issues between the parties; thirdly, the reason the 
new expert is wanted; fourthly, the amount at stake and, if it is not purely money, 
the nature of the issues at stake and their importance; fifthly, the effect of 
permitting one party to call further expert evidence on the conduct of the trial; 
sixthly, the delay, if any, in making the application, seventhly, any delay that the 
instructing and calling of the new expert will cause; eighthly, any other special 
features of the case; and, finally, and in a sense all embracing, the overall justice 
to the parties in the context of the litigation” 
 
By contrast in Popek v National Westminster Bank48 the plaintiff sought permission to 
appeal against an order, made on the third day of a trial, striking out his claim on the 
basis that no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim had been disclosed49. The claim 
was for breach of contract, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in relation to a 
construction project. A single joint expert had been instructed to give evidence on the 
defendant's advice and financial arrangements. The trial judge accepted the joint expert's 
                                                 
45 [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1382 CA 
46 It is worth noting that Lord Woolf, the author of the “Access to Justice” reports that led to the CPR, gave 
the leading judgments in both Peet and D(A Child) v Walker 
47 [2001] CPLR 177 
48 [2002] EWCA Civ 42 
49 CPR Part 3.4(2)(a) states “The court may strike out a statement of case (i.e. a pleading) if it appears to 
the court- (a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the 
claim” 
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evidence without allowing the plaintiff to cross-examine her. The Court of Appeal held 
that the judge was entitled to both strike out the claim on the basis of the joint expert's 
report and to refuse cross-examination by the plaintiff as he could have put written 
questions to the joint expert in advance of trial.  
 
Finally, if no additional evidence is permitted and the only expert evidence at trial is that 
of the single joint expert, what about cross-examination? In Peet v. Mid-Kent Healthcare 
Trust, the Court of Appeal held that, normally, there should be no need for a single joint 
expert’s report to be “amplified or tested by cross-examination”. If, however, it needed 
amplification or a party wished to subject it to cross-examination, the court had a 
discretion to order the same but the process should be “restricted”. A similar view, as 
already noted, was expressed in D(A Child) v Walker. 
 
3.5 Statement of truth 
 
By Order 38 rule 37A every expert report is to be verified by statement of truth in 
accordance with Order 41A rule 2.  
 
The form of the statement of truth is prescribed by Order 41A rule 5(2): 
 
 “I believe that the facts stated in this [name document being verified] are true 
and (if applicable) the opinion expressed in it is honestly held” 
 
The statements of truth in expert reports must be signed by their makers. An expert report 
that is not verified by a statement of truth is not admissible in evidence unless otherwise 
ordered by the Court (Order 41A rule 7). The court may also order a person who has 
failed to verify a document to do so. Finally, proceedings for contempt of court may be 
brought against a person if he makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a 
document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth (Order 41A 
rule 9). 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE 
 
It can be seen that the new Order 38 (and Appendix D) implements the three substantive 
recommendations in the Working Party’s Final Report, namely: 
 
Recommendation 103 - a rule that, firstly, the expert declares in writing that he 
has read a court-approved code of conduct for experts and agrees to be bound by 
it; that he understands his duty to the court and will comply with that duty. Also, 
expert reports to be verified by a statement of truth. 
 
Recommendation 104 - a code and a declaration for expert witnesses 
  
Recommendation 107 - the court has the power to order the parties to appoint a 
single joint expert 
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Unfortunately, Proposals 39(d) and (e) in the Interim Report did not become 
Recommendations in the Final Report nor make it to the RHC. These were: 
 
“(d) Requiring expert reports prepared for use by the court to state the substance 
of all material instructions conveyed in any form, on the basis of which the report 
was prepared, abrogating to the extent necessary, any legal professional privilege 
attaching to such instructions, but subject to reasonable restrictions on further 
disclosure of communications between the party and such expert. 
 
(e) Permitting experts to approach the court in their own names and capacity for 
directions without notice to the parties, at the expense of one or all of the parties, 
as directed by the court.” 
 
Proposal 39(d) was objected to on the basis that it would indeed abrogate legal 
professional privilege and raise the possibility of parties having to retain a second set of 
experts. Others argued that such a rule was unnecessary since (what became) 
Recommendations 103 and 104 would make it difficult for “a respectable expert” to 
make the required declaration or to verify his report with a statement of truth if his 
opinion had been subverted by those retaining him. These objections do, of course, miss 
the point that the Proposal, which is based on CPR Part 35.10(4), is designed to deal with 
those individuals who are not “respectable” experts.  
 
A more valid concern was that such a provision could infringe Article 35 of the Basic 
Law50. It is submitted that this concern is misplaced. Firstly, in the nine years since it was 
introduced, CPR 35.10(4) has not been found to infringe the general rights to a fair trial 
and privacy conferred by Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
It is therefore difficult to see how it would undermine the similar, albeit more tightly 
worded, right protected by Article 35. Further, Article 35 is designed to protect Hong 
Kong residents’ right to “confidential legal advice”. Expert witnesses do not provide 
legal advice and, moreover, their duty is to the court not to the parties. The argument 
against the adoption of Proposal 39(d) is therefore, by a logical extension, an argument 
against The Ikarian Reefer and the new Order 38 rule 35A51.  
 
Proposal 39(e), based on CPR Part 35.14, was objected to because, among other reasons, 
it would “inject distrust between a party and his lawyers on the one hand and the experts 
on the other”; it was not transparent; and was likely to erode legal professional privilege. 
The Final Report noted that the UK Academy of Experts had advised that CPR Part 35.14 
had been amended (since the Interim Report) so that experts now serve a copy of their 
proposed request for directions on the parties. Having said this, the Academy of Experts 
felt that the provision was unnecessary save as “a measure of last resort”. The Working 
                                                 
50 The text of which is “Hong Kong residents shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to the 
courts, choice of lawyers for timely protection of their lawful rights and interests or for representation in 
the courts, and to judicial remedies ......” 
51 See Edis, A Privilege and immunity: problems of expert evidence C.J.Q. 2007, 26(Jan), 40-56 for an 
argument that legal professional privilege ought not to apply to communications between an expert witness 
and the party calling the expert. 
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Party, in light of the objections from the Law Society, Bar Association and other ‘dispute 
resolution professionals’, grabbed at this comment as justification for reversing their 
earlier support for Proposal 39(e).  
 
The Working Party also decided not to recommend the adoption of: 
i. CPR Part 35.4(4) - giving the court power to cap recoverable expert fees; 
ii. CPR Part 35.6 - allowing a party one chance to put written questions to an expert 
to clarify his report; and, 
iii. CPR Part 35.9 - enabling a party access to information held by the other side but 
not reasonably available to himself. 
 
This was on the basis of the Academy of Expert’s submission that CPR Part 35.4(4) is 
not used in practice; that CPR Part 35.6 is “a useful power” but is often misused; and 
CPR Part 35.9 is rarely used since the information needed is generally obtained through 
discovery. 
 
With respect, this is the opinion of one institution only and, with the exception of CPR 
35.9, does not reflect the experience of many practitioners. CPR Part 35.4(4) was used in 
Kranidotes v Paschali52 to limit the fee of an accountant single joint expert. The court 
then terminated that expert’s instructions when his quoted fee far exceeded the value of 
the claim. CPR Part 35.6 is very useful, especially in complex cases and the courts have 
been vigorous at clamping down on attempted abuses53. Further, a survey of litigation 
solicitors was carried out by Smith & Williamson in 2002, which discovered that only 
64% of them had taken advantage of CPR 35.6 and, of those, 91% found it “useful”54. 
This survey, carried out at about the same time as the Academy of Experts would have 
prepared its comments for the CJR Working Party, does not suggest widespread abuse of 
the rule. It should also be noted that an equivalent of CPR Part 35.6 has been adopted in 
Singapore (Order 40A r.4) and that the NSW Uniform Civil Procedure Rules enable 
parties to seek limited clarification of a single joint expert’s report (rule 31.41). 
 
A more significant practical problem may arise, however, in relation to something which 
has been included in Order 38. As already observed, Order 38 rule 4A is based on CPR 
Part 35.7, whereby the English courts have the power to direct that evidence is to be 
given by a single joint expert only. As under Order 38 rule 4A, the court may select an 
expert from a list prepared or identified by the parties, or direct that the expert be selected 
in some other manner as the court may direct. Unfortunately, Order 38 rule 4A stops 
there and the RHC do not contain the equivalent of CPR Part 35.8 which states: 
                                                 
52 [2001] EWCA Civ 357 
53 See the following passage of the Admiralty and Commercial Court Guide - “H2.19 (b) The court will pay 
close attention to the use of this procedure [CPR 35.6] (especially where separate experts are instructed) to 
ensure that it remains an instrument for the helpful exchange of information. The court will not allow it to 
interfere with the procedure for an exchange of professional opinion at a meeting of experts, or to inhibit 
that exchange of professional opinion. In cases where (for example) questions that are oppressive in 
number or content are put, or questions are put for any purpose other than clarification of the report, the 
court will not hesitate to disallow the questions and to make an appropriate order for costs against the party 
putting them.” 
54 www.legalweek.com/Articles/111840/A+meeting+of+minds.html  
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(1) Where the court gives a direction under rule 35.7 for a single joint expert to 
be used, each instructing party may give instructions to the expert. 
(2) When an instructing party gives instructions to the expert he must, at the same 
time, send a copy of the instructions to the other instructing parties. 
(3) The court may give directions about–– 
(a) the payment of the expert’s fees and expenses; and 
(b) any inspection, examination or experiments which the expert wishes to carry 
out. 
(4) The court may, before an expert is instructed–– 
(a) limit the amount that can be paid by way of fees and expenses to the expert; 
and 
(b) direct that the instructing parties pay that amount into court. 
(5) Unless the court otherwise directs, the instructing parties are jointly and 
severally liable for the payment of the expert’s fees and expenses. 
 
The supporting CPR Practice Direction 35 and “Protocol for the Instruction of Experts to 
give evidence in Civil Claims” provide further guidance on the selection, instruction and 
conduct of single joint experts. There is NO such guidance in Order 38 nor in the Code at 
Appendix D to the RHC. This is a major failing of the new rules as, at the very least, it 
leaves such matters to the unguided discretion of the courts.  
 
Finally, in respect of the Code, whilst there is much to be said for brevity, it is too brief. 
The opportunity has been lost for providing further guidance on such matters as the 
conduct of experts instructed only to advise; the responsibilites of those instructing 
experts; the withdrawal of experts from the proceedings; and the possible attendance of 
the parties (and their legal advisers) at discussions between experts. In respect of the last 
of these issues, there appears to have been little attention given to the use in Australia of 
concurrent expert evidence, known as ‘hot tubbing’, involving a session at which expert 
evidence is put forward, during a joint discussion between experts, judge and lawyers55. 
 
The results of these and other omissions may be costly satellite litigation, defeating the 
whole purpose of the reforms. 
 
 
GM 15.12.08 
 
 
 
55 Edmond, G Secrets Of The "Hot Tub": Expert Witnesses, Concurrent Evidence And Judge-Led Law 
Reform In Australia C.J.Q. 2008, 27(1), 51-82 
